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We examine institutional pressures as antecedents of environmental innovation. Drawing on 
institutional theory and a resourced-based view of the company, we argue that regulatory and 
normative forces influence the companies’ propensity to innovate in environmental-related 
projects. Furthermore, we suggest that this relationship is contingent on the availability and 
specificity of the companies’ resources. These relationships were tested using environmental 
patents and citations of 340 publicly-traded companies from polluting industries in the U.S. 
Results suggest that institutional pressures can be a source of competitive advantage, and 
regulatory forces are becoming more strongly associated with environmental innovations as the 
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CAN INSTITUTIONAL FORCES CREATE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE? 





A central tenet of institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 1995) suggests that institutional pressures lead organizations to adopt similar structures, 
strategies, and processes. That is, external forces work to make companies more alike – what 
institutional literature calls “organizational isomorphism” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Government, industrial associations, and other social actors define actions deemed acceptable 
and exert pressures on companies for conformity. In order to reduce environmental uncertainty 
and conform to social expectations, companies imitate practices used by other organizations 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993). In turn, companies gain social support as 
legitimacy is endorsed by institutional actors (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
According to this perspective, companies adopt similar practices to avoid the pitfalls of newness 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Singh, Tucker, and House, 1984). Consequently, innovation may be a 
harmful strategy for companies because, by challenging standard practices, they jeopardize 
their legitimacy. In the words of Deephouse (1996, p. 1026), “organizations that innovate or 
have unique strategies suffer in terms of legitimacy – such behaviors is questioned or even 
deemed unacceptable by external actors”. Paradoxically, however, it has also been suggested 
that organizational legitimacy is actually a key factor that enables companies to innovate. 
Under the rubric of institutional theory and resource dependence theory, Sherer and Lee (2002) 
argued that legitimate organizations are likely to create and experiment with new technical 
rationales that differ from current standards precisely because they have the high status to be 
different. This apparent contradiction suggests that important gaps in our understanding of the 
relationships between institutional pressures, innovation, and legitimacy still remain. Especially 
noteworthy is that there has been little consideration of how external forces may contribute to 
technological innovation. 
Using polluting industries as the setting for our study, we explore these relationships by 
drawing on insights from institutional theory and a resource-based view of the company 
(hereafter referred to as “RBV”). We propose a hybrid framework to argue that regulatory forces 
(i.e., those emanating from governments) and normative forces (i.e., those stemming from the 
industry) towards environmental concerns demand unique responses and generate business 
opportunities that prompt environmental-related innovations. We further suggest that 
companies are more likely to respond innovatively to institutional pressures when they possess  
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resources and these resources are specific. We test our theoretical arguments using longitudinal 
data (1997-2001) of 120 publicly traded companies from polluting industries in the U.S. 
Overall, our results support our general contention.  
Our work makes important contributions to current literature. First, by combining insights from 
institutional theory and RBV, we strengthen the explanatory power of both. We broaden 
institutional theory by offering an alternative logic to the traditional institutional prediction 
that suggests external forces work towards isomorphism. We investigate the extent to which 
external forces can actually generate unique and inimitable internal capabilities, and how this 
relationship is affected by a company’s resources. In tandem, we enhance RBV by including 
contextual factors in the development of organizational capabilities. Our study suggests that 
innovation can result not only in economic gains but also a response to societal expectations. 
Therefore, our combined framework allows us to uncover the missing link between institutional 
pressures, innovation, and organizational legitimacy. Second, while links between company-
level factors and innovative actions have drawn significant attention of scholars (Balkin, 
Markman, and Gómez-Mejía, 2000; Wu, 2007), contextual aspects and their influence on 
innovation have been only obliquely studied. Thus, our study contributes to innovation 
literature by analyzing how institutional factors affect the company’s propensity to innovate. 
Third, we enlarge environmental management literature by bringing together two theories 
extensively used in the field. By doing so, we offer a more holistic view that provides a solid 
platform for understanding the antecedents of environmental innovation. We also contribute 
empirically to this field by approaching environmental innovation through patent activity (i.e., 
patent count and citations). In previous studies, environmental innovation has been commonly 
measured through questionnaire surveys (Anton, Deltas, and Khanna, 2004; Christmann, 2000; 
Theyel, 2000). However, responses of these questionnaires may be seriously biased, as 
respondents tend to present a socially desirable image of themselves or their companies 
(Golden, 1992). At the same time, research using environmental patents has been conducted at 
country or industry levels,
1 but company level analyses are almost non-existent. Thus, we 
incorporate into previous environmental research this long-established measure of innovation. 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Two different theoretical approaches have been commonly used in literature to offer insights 
regarding environmental issues: Institutional theory and the resource-based view of the 
company (RBV). While both theories make important explanatory contributions in their own 
right, they focus on different domains of organizational action. Institutional theory 
acknowledges the role of external forces in shaping organizational activities and emphasizes 
the importance of legitimacy. RBV, on the other hand, dictates that company’s internal 
resources can be a source of competitive advantage in markets when the company’s rivals 
cannot obtain like resources. In this paper, we argue that each of these approaches contains a 
kernel of truth that explains environmental innovation, but none provides by itself a full 
explanatory account of this phenomenon. We suggest that research on environmental 
innovation can be advanced by a conceptual merger of both frameworks. Indeed, recent studies 
from both strategic and environmental management (Bansal, 2005; Clemens and Douglas, 2006; 
Darnall, Henriques, and Sadorsky, in press; Oliver, 1997) have sought increasing explanatory 
power in the convergence of both perspectives. 
                                              
1 A summary of representative studies in the area is available from the authors upon request.   
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Institutional Theory and Environmental Issues 
Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995, 2005) 
focuses its attention on the role of social influence for social conformity in shaping 
organizations’ actions. Because organizations are assumed to be approval-seeking, they are 
susceptible to social influence. One of the main theses of institutional theory is that 
organizations act to enhance or protect their legitimacy (Scott, 1995). By adopting strategies in 
adherence to institutional prescriptions, companies reflect an alignment of corporate and 
societal values (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). When companies conform to societal pressures, they 
gain a legitimacy that secures organizational success and survival (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). Thus, concern over legitimacy influences companies 
by forcing them to adopt certain managerial practices that are expected to be socially valuable 
(Deephouse, 1999; Scott, 1995). Institutional theory does not directly address efficiency issues 
nor the impact of strategies on performance, since it explains the implementation of practices 
without obvious economic value. Yet it recognizes the value that these practices provide in 
terms of legitimacy and its importance for a company’s endurance (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; 
Scott, 1995). A gain in legitimacy can benefit an organization since it aids in securing access to 
valuable resources, provides a license to operate and innovate, lowers risk, enhances reputation, 
and strengthens stakeholder relations (Deephouse, 1999; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fombrun, 
1996; Sherer and Lee, 2002; Staw and Epstein, 2000). 
A conventional argument of institutional theory is that pressure for institutional conformity 
leads to a company’s adoption of the same strategies and structures as those adopted by other 
actors within the organizational field. These “copycat” practices often lead organizations to 
resemble each other and beget the classical explanation of homogeneity across companies (i.e., 
isomorphism) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Indeed, institutional theory has successfully 
explained how conforming to societal expectations increases legitimacy, reduces uncertainty, 
and increases standardization. However, institutional theory has been criticized (e.g., Kondra 
and Hinings, 1998; Powell, 1991) for ignoring organizational diversity and how organizations 
change since, under the institutional perspective, there are few incentives to innovate since 
adopting unique strategies can seriously hinder the company’s legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996). 
Institutional theory has been extensively used in environmental management (e.g., Bansal, 
2005; Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Delmas, 2002; Hoffman, 1997, 1999, and 2000; Jennings and 
Zandbergen, 1995). For example, Hoffman (1997) studied the chemical and petroleum industries 
from 1960 to 1993, using institutional theory as the conceptual lens for understanding how 
these industries have changed due to increasing pressures for environmental management. 
From an institutional perspective, Bansal and Clelland (2004) showed that environmentally-
legitimate companies incur less unsystematic stock market risk than illegitimate companies. 
Also applying institutional theory, Delmas (2002) explained the variation in the implementation 
of ISO 14001 across Europe and the United States. More recently, Bansal (2005) analyzed the 
influence of institutional factors on corporate sustainable development. 
A key prediction of institutional theory applied to environmental issues refers to the gain in 
legitimacy. Because of their impact on the natural environment and society, companies tend to 
be scrutinized more intensely by different stakeholders like government, media, consumers, and 
activists. Given the increased social awareness of organizational wrongdoing and the explicit 
environmental demands, institutional theory predicts that companies can gain legitimacy by 
reducing their impact on the environment and exhibiting good environmental performance 
(Bansal, 2005; Bansal and Clelland, 2004).  
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Resourced-Based View of the Company and the Natural Environment 
The resource-based view of the company (RBV) (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) argues that 
value-creating strategies are those that create resources and capabilities with profit potential. 
Resources and capabilities include tangible inputs such as people, property, and capital, and 
intangible resources like skills and know-how (Barney, Wright, and Ketchen, 2001). The 
endurance of profit from these resources and capabilities are determined by their uniqueness, 
scarcity, value, inimitability, and non-substitutability (Barney, 1991; Barney, Wright, and 
Ketchen, 2001; Peteraf, 1993). These features enable a company to obtain above-normal rates 
of return since it is difficult for a company’s rivals to obtain or duplicate these resources and 
capabilities in the market. Consequently, resources and capabilities ultimately define the 
company’s competitive advantage. According to this perspective, the final goal of the company 
is to attain sustainable competitive advantage, and this occurs when the bundle of resources 
and capabilities provides above-average returns in the long-run (Porter, 2004). As a result, RBV 
assumes that resource choice, procurement, and creation are driven by economic and efficiency 
motives (Oliver, 1997). 
In contrast to the institutional perspective, the RBV framework explains heterogeneity across 
companies, since factors that inhibit the imitations of resources increase variation in companies’ 
strategies. The RBV approach suggests that, as resources become redundant, companies have to  
continually reinvent themselves through growth and investment, taking advantage of early 
adotoption, and tending to deploy resources sequentially as they develop (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). Thus, innovation is not only possible but probably 
essential for organizations to succeed. In other words, the capability to innovate has the potential 
to become a source of competitive advantage since innovations are knowledge-based, socially 
complex, and causally ambiguous, and thus more likely to be idiosyncratic to the company in 
which this capability resides (Barney, 1991; Barney, Wright, and Ketchen,, 2001; Grant, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993). Indeed, it is a major challenge for technological innovators to obtain talented 
scientists and engineers and to develop successful innovation that can be taken to the market. 
Thus, innovations may be the path for organizations to become unique and sufficiently different 
to avoid competitors’ imitation. 
RBV is perhaps the most influential framework in environmental management, especially since 
the seminal work of Hart in 1995. He proposed the natural resource-based view of the 
company. In his article, Hart argued that good environmental behavior can be a source of 
competitive advantage. When companies effectively respond to environmental demands and 
challenges in innovative ways, they gain new resources and develop capabilities that can 
provide an edge over competitors. Environmental innovations can lead to more complex, 
environmentally benign products, processes and services. These in turn can lower overall 
company costs and legal liabilities (Christmann, 2000; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Sharma and 
Vredenburg, 1998), lead to price premiums (Shrivastava, 1995), enhance a company’s 
reputation, and secure social legitimacy (Hart, 1995). Like other company-specific resources, 
these environmental capabilities that are difficult to create and imitate become embedded, 
valuable, and a source of long-term competitive advantage (Bansal, 2005; Hart, 1995; Russo 
and Fouts, 1997; Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998). Ultimately they also enhance the company’s 
financial performance (Dowell, Hart, and Yeung, 2000; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; King and Lenox, 
2002; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 1997).  
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Integrating Institutional Theory and Resource-Based View perspectives: An 
Environmental View 
The foregoing paragraphs summarize the key postulations from both conceptual perspectives. 
The hybrid framework we propose is motivated by the complementary nature of these two 
approaches and it is relevant since neither perspective in its own right has the capacity to 
provide a full explanation of organizational behaviors. For instance, institutional theory focuses 
on external forces and seeks to explain organization-context relations from an overarching 
social view, while RBV concentrates on the development of internal resources and capabilities. 
Thus, a combined framework allows us to examine the dynamics of the interface between 
institutional contexts and organizational level strategies (such environmental innovation) by 
highlighting their unique and complementary nature (Oliver, 1997). 
Moreover, institutional theory puts emphasis on the legitimacy-seeking behaviors of companies. 
According to the institutional perspective, organizations conform to societal expectations in 
order to increase their legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities, but reasons of efficiency 
are often ignored. Conversely, RBV can be criticized for excessive emphasis on resource 
markets and economically rational choices without taking into account the social context 
within which companies’ choices are embedded and how this context might affect companies’ 
sustainable competitive advantage development (Ginsberg, 1994; Oliver, 1997). However, other 
external circumstances beyond economic factors are also likely to affect the development of 
resources and competitive advantage (Barney, Wright, and Ketchen, 2001; Oliver, 1997). As 
stated by Oliver (1997), “resource selection and sustainable competitive advantage are 
profoundly influenced… by the institutional context” (Oliver, 1997, p. 698). Indeed, in real-life 
situations, a company is likely to contemplate both the relevance of proper responsiveness to 
institutional forces and the importance of creating valuable resources. Therefore, a combined 
approach can provide a clearer framework to explain decisions regarding competitive 
advantage creation. 
Also, previous research has limited the influence of institutional pressures to the context of 
industries. Our combined framework helps to recognize that external pressures differ across 
organizations even when they operate in the same field, and this could have differential effects 
on companies (c.f., Hoffman, 2001; Milstein, Hart, and York, 2002). Finally, little attempt has 
been made to explore how institutional pressures may affect the company’s ability to innovate. 
The combination of institutional theory and RBV provides a convenient framework to test the 
extent to which institutional pressures are in fact constructive in enhancing the company’s 
outcomes. 
Different implications can be derived from the combination of these two diverse but 
complementary theoretical perspectives: (1) Institutional pressures indicate the way the 
company is expected to behave (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 
1995). They define a company’s socially acceptable conduct and shape decisions regarding 
organizational efforts and resource allocations (Oliver, 1997); (2) Institutional pressures create 
opportunities and companies can seize them by responding strategically. That is, companies do 
not remain impassive to external influence and they can respond strategically to institutional 
pressures (Hoffman and Ventresca, 2002; Lawrence, 1999; Oliver, 1991, 1997). Innovating 
within the limits established by institutional contexts allows companies to conform to social 
demands while searching for competitive advantage; (3) Higher degrees of institutional 
pressures require more unequivocal and definitive responses from the company in order to 
avoid losses from the misfit between organizational actions and societal expectations. That is,  
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the more the company fails to achieve institutional demands, the greater the subsequent effort 
it has to devote to reduce dissonance between organizational actions and societal requirements 
(Milstein, Hart, and York, 2002); (4) A company’s decisions regarding social demands are also 
marked by economic components that make them more akin to market demands. In tandem, 
economic choices and resource selection are influenced by societal imperatives (Oliver, 1997). 
Thus, a company needs to accomplish an appropriate combination of institutional and 
efficiency responsiveness (Martinez and Dacin, 1999); (5) The development of key resources and 
capabilities together with the achievement of legitimacy gained through social compliance are 
vital for organizational success and survival (Barney, 1991; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Porter, 2004; Scott, 1995; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
The application of these premises to the natural environment suggests that institutional forces 
will pressure companies to behave according to their environmental concerns. Institutional 
pressures constrain organizations’ actions but at the same time create business opportunities. In 
order to seize these opportunities, companies need to develop increasingly novel and complex 
technologies that reduce or eliminate toxic waste so that they are not mimicked by rivals. In 
this context, innovation in environmental-related issues is essential to create capabilities that 
enable the company to seize market opportunities for sustainable development (Bansal, 2005; 
Hart, 1995). 
Furthermore, institutional pressures do not come in isolation. Actors within an institutional 
field do not only exert pressure, but often provide guiding principles, technical assistance, and 
specialized information that define actions deemed legitimate. For instance, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) enforces environmental regulations and persecutes violators but it also 
launches initiatives like the EPA 33/50 program, which provided companies with professional 
information to reduce discharges of industrial toxic pollutants (Arora and Cason, 1996). 
Similarly, the Chemical Manufacturers’ Association (a trade association of the U.S. chemical 
sector) created the Responsible Care Program to help its members reduce toxic emissions by 
providing a series of principles and managerial practices (King and Lenox, 2000). These 
external support and assistance may be additional incentives for companies to embark on 
environmental innovations. 
Environmental innovations appear as an advantageous strategic direction because, on the one 
hand, they offer an effective response to the environmental demands of stakeholders of the 
company since these innovations are intended to reduce or eliminate the toxic burden of 
production processes to the natural environment. On the other hand, environmental innovations 
are, by definition, company-specific and hard to copy (Markman, Espina, and Phan, 2004). 
Moreover, the value of environmental innovation derives not only from the potential economic 
gains of the innovation but also from the legitimacy obtained by conforming to societal 
expectations. By innovating in environmental-related issues, companies that respond to the 
external demands also obtain legitimacy and secure their survival and, at the same time, they 
create resources and capabilities that are unique, difficult to imitate, and of recognized value in 
obtaining abnormal returns. And, even when R&D activities are inherently risky because they 
provide greater variability of outcomes, require long-term investments and entail greater 
probability of disruption, environmental innovation could be a less costly choice than the risk of 
being stigmatized as irresponsible corporate citizens. A misfit between stakeholders’ expectations 
and a company’s actions can be deadly for the company since it can result in loss of legitimacy, 
deterioration of reputation, unfair contracts, and a consequently higher likelihood of failure 
(Deephouse, 1999; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Based on these arguments, we contend that 
institutional forces have a positive impact on environmental innovation.  
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Regulatory Forces and Environmental Innovation 
Scott (1995) identified three basic “pillars” of institutions - regulative, normative, and cognitive – 
that provide structure and meaning to organizational behavior. The regulatory element provides 
explicit guidance to organization through rules, controls, rewards, and sanctions. The normative 
element guides behavior through a less explicit system of norms and values. The cognitive pillar 
refers to cultural elements that govern choice, often without receiving conscious thought. 
Although Scott recognized that all institutions combine the three elements, he suggested in a 
recent review of institutional theory that regulatory and normative forces are of special interest 
when analyzing institutional pressures (Scott, 2005). 
Regulatory forces can adopt different forms like persuasion, collusion, or coercion. Typically, 
regulatory forces are conceived by governments. One positive outcome of the organization 
being subject to regulatory forces is the legitimacy derived from the recognition of the 
organization’s existence by the regulatory jurisdiction, allowing it to function and operate 
(Deephouse, 1996). 
Oliver (1991) suggested that when the degree of legitimacy and economic gains attainable from 
conformity to institutional pressures combine with a high level of legal coercion, the more 
likely it is that the company conducts activities in line with such pressures. Consequently, to 
the extent that environmental strategies are a source of legitimacy and provide an economic 
edge, greater degrees of regulatory forces should be reflected in more environmental initiatives. 
This prediction is also consistent with RBV arguments used in environmental management 
literature. According to this view, pollution is seen as inefficiencies in the use of inputs, and 
flaws in product design and production (Hart, 1995; Porter and van der Linde, 1995a, and 
1995b; Shrivastava, 1995). Environmental regulations may induce companies to use alternative 
processes and root out these inefficiencies, enhancing profitability. As a result, companies that 
face stronger environmental regulation are more likely to innovate, and innovate more, than 
companies with weaker regulatory forces (Porter and van der Linde, 1995b). Empirical evidence 
at country and industry levels supports this prediction (Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Jaffe 
and Palmer, 1997; Lanjouw and Mody, 1996). 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Regulatory forces will have a positive impact on environmental 
innovation. 
Normative Forces and Environmental Innovation 
Normative influences arise from values and norms (Scott, 1995). These norms and values are 
defined by a social interaction context that identifies appropriate behavior for group members 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As a result, normative influences typically come from the industry 
and professional organizations that establish standards for operations (Scott, 1995, 2005). 
Normative influences, often implicit, are related to the issue of legitimacy. In their quest for 
legitimacy, organizations compare themselves to their peers and try to behave in accordance to 
standards established by the industry and other members of the organizational field (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). Consequently, those companies positioned away from those 
standards face greater normative pressures than those that meet or surpass such standards. As a 
result, companies that perform below the ‘environmental’ level assumed to be acceptable by the 
industry are expected to have a greater incentive to innovate. Innovation in environmental- 
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related issues can help the company to reduce distances with respect to other members of the 
industry, and consequently enhance legitimacy.  
Previous works in strategic environmental management (King and Lenox, 2000; Klassen and 
Whybark, 1999) claimed that poorly performing companies are likely to adopt strategically 
green initiatives established by the industry to which they belong. King and Lenox (2000) 
argued that this is so because, on the one hand, these are the companies that can benefit most 
from these initiatives and, on the other hand, they can obtain an insurance against risks like 
claims for negligence and costly regulatory sanctions. Thus, we expect a positive link between 
normative forces and voluntary initiatives like environmental innovation. 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Normative forces will have a positive impact on environmental 
innovation. 
The Moderating Role of Companies’ Resources 
Strategy is constrained by, and dependent on, the company’s resources profile (Bourgeois, 1981; 
Cyert and March, 1963; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Resources give the company leeway in 
choosing the best strategy in response to the external requirements (Bourgeois, 1981; Sharfman, 
Wolf, Chase, and Tansik, 1988) and, at the same time, are critical determinants of knowledge 
creation and organizational capabilities (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998; Makadok and 
Barney, 2001). Moreover, resources have a drastic influence on the company’s environmental 
performance (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006). Therefore, resources are likely to play a main role in 
the relationship between external influences and environmental innovation. Specifically, we 
propose that the effect of institutional pressures on a company’s environmental innovation is 
contingent on two characteristics of resources, namely availability and specificity. 
Availability of resources, often called organizational slack, refers to “that cushion of actual or 
potential resources which allows an organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for 
adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy as well to initiate changes in strategy 
with respect to the external environment” (Bourgeois, 1981). Higher levels of resources provide 
the company with greater flexibility towards, and better understanding of, external influences 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Meyer, 1982). Resources enhance an organization’s adaptability 
because strategic choices are more abundant, and it can respond faster and more effectively 
than companies with limited resources. For instance, Smith and colleagues (1991) contended 
that companies with more ample resources can invest in sophisticated information systems that 
enhance the understanding of external influences and, because of those resources, companies 
can respond in unique and competitive manners. Applying this logic to our setting, it indicates 
that companies with more resources are able to be more sensitive to the environmental 
demands that emanate from external factors and can afford entirely new actions, like the 
development of environmental-friendly products or processes. In contrast, strategic choices are 
constrained for companies with low resources as they have limited options, reduced capability 
of change, and can be forced to either ignore environmental demands or respond to them in a 
more cosmetic way. 
Additionally, resources buffer companies from uncertainty and enable them to take risky 
initiatives in response to external pressures (Chattopadhyay, Glick, and Huber, 2001; Nohria 
and Gulati, 1996). R&D projects are inherently risky given that innovation efforts might fail 
despite the best intentions of managers. Resources allow companies to generously experiment 
with novel ideas and introduce new products in the market without the restraints faced by low- 
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resource companies (Moses, 1992). Therefore, organizations with higher levels of resources are 
more likely to engage in more innovative projects that might not be approved in more 
resource-constrained companies (Cyert and March, 1963). This logic indicates that, given that 
institutional pressures for environmentally good behaviors can spawn business opportunities 
(Darnall, Henriques, and Sadorsky, 2005; Hoffman and Ventresca, 2002; Sharma, 2000), those 
companies with more resources would innovate more in environmental-related projects, while 
companies lacking resource would see these initiatives as very risky courses of action and, thus, 
avoid them. 
Aforementioned arguments not only apply to tangible resources like financial slack, but also 
are applicable to intangible resources such as the stock of technological knowledge. Makadok 
and Barney (2001, p. 1624) argued that “the potential value of a new resource depends on the 
pre-existing stock of resources that are already controlled by that firm”. This is particularly true 
for innovation activities since the company’s ability to innovate increases its absorptive 
capacity to learn and take advantage of existing and new technological knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, companies with a large stock of intangible resources such as pre-
existing technological knowledge would be more able to conduct R&D activities directed to 
develop environmental innovations as a response to institutional pressures, than those 
companies with less innovation resources. In addition, companies respond with environmental 
innovation that complements the development of company-specific resources (e.g. Russo and 
Fouts, 1997; Christmann, 2000; Klassen and Whybark, 1999; Aragón-Correa et al, 2004; 
Shrivastava, 1995). 
Moreover, companies with more resources have more capital at risk than companies lacking 
those resources and, therefore, would be more willing to protect their interests by expanding 
their portfolio of patents. This is particularly true when the company’s resources are very 
specific. A well established argument from transaction cost economics is that contracts are less 
effective against expropriation the higher the specificity of assets involved, that is the higher 
the cost of redeploying company resources (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 
1985). For instance, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004) applied this argument to 
explain the strong rise of the propensity to patent in the semiconductors sector after the 1980s’ 
strengthening of U.S. patents rights. Authors found that companies with high capital intensity 
(a proxy for the level of asset specificity) participate in “patent portfolio races” to respond 
strategically to hold-up problems. Because heavy polluters are subject to more stringent 
external pressures, which in turn increase their chances of bankruptcy (Cohen, 1987), those 
companies with larger sunk costs in specific assets have more to lose and, consequently, will 
see more value in securing environmental ideas by patenting environmental-related projects 
more heavily. Moreover, the greater potential losses in the case of bankruptcy for these 
c o m p a n i e s  p u t  t h e m  i n  a  w e a k  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  i n  c a s e  t h e y  n e e d  t o  r e l y  o n  e x t e r n a l  
providers of green technologies. This last argument further increases the incentives of capital-
intensive companies towards environmental patenting when they face strong institutional 
pressures. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2a): Availability of resources moderates the relationship between institutional 
forces and environmental innovation. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2b): Specificity of resources moderates the relationship between institutional 
forces and environmental innovation.  
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Methods 
Sample and Data Collection 
We test our hypotheses with a sample of highly innovative companies belonging to the 20 most 
polluting sectors according to the EPA’s TRI (Toxic Release Inventory) program. After compiling 
all the necessary information from three different databases, we end up with an unbalanced 
panel of 340 U.S. publicly traded companies for the period 1997-2001. The final list of 
companies was constructed as follows: First, we identified the 20 most polluting sectors by 
ranking industry sectors at the 2-digit SIC codes based on the total amount of toxic emissions 
for the period under analysis using the TRI database.
2 Then we obtained the list of U.S. 
companies belonging to these top polluting sectors from COMPUSTAT database. Finally, we 
checked at the U.S. Patents and Trademarks Office which of these companies had more than 40 
patents in the analyzed period and obtained the final sample of highly innovative and polluting 
companies. We focus on these companies since they are expected to have both the motivation 
and the capability to successfully undertake environmental R&D activities. However, an 
interesting observation from our sample is that only around 15% of these companies have at 
least one environmental patent in the analyzed period. 
Once the list of companies had been identified, the data about environmental innovations were 
obtained from Nameroff et al. (2004) who used information from the CHI’s Patent Citation 
Indicators database. This database tracks information about environmental patents of 
companies with more than 40 patents in the last 5 years. This database represents more than 
60% of all U.S. patents granted since 1992 and more than 70% of those patents that are not 
held by private individuals.
3 In their study, the authors provided company-assignees of over 
3,200 environmental-related patents during 1983-2001 and the number of forward citations for 
each of the patents. We aggregated data by parent companies of these companies using 
multiple sources, including Mergent Manuals, which compile data regarding subsidiaries, 
COMPUSTAT database, and companies’ websites. 
Information regarding institutional forces was gathered from the U.S. Environmental Protection 




We use patent data to measure a company’s ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION. Patent counts have 
basically two limitations as measures of innovation output. First, not all innovations are expected 
to be patented. Previous evidence from survey data (Levin et al. 1987; Cohen et al., 2000) has 
reported that the effectiveness of patents as protection mechanisms varies strongly across sectors. 
By including sector-fixed effects in the estimation, we take into account, at least partially, this 
                                              
2 The 20 most polluting sectors for the analyzed period, using the 2-digit SIC code, are: 10, 50, 33, 49, 28, 36, 12, 13, 
20, 32, 30, 51, 26, 34, 29, 31, 35, 37, 24, 27. 
3 See Nameroff et al. (2004) for a more comprehensive description of the CHI Research Inc database. A full 
description of the patent search filter used to identify environmental patents is available at 
http://www.chemistry.org/greenchemistryinstitute  
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issue as we allow for the time-invariant differences in the likelihood of patenting a given 
environmental innovation by sector. A second problem of using patents as an indicator of the 
amount of environmental innovation is that patent counts do not distinguish among different 
qualities of innovative outputs. That is, some patents are very valuable while some are worth 
almost nothing. Recognizing this problem, Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) and Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (2000) among others, have found more creative ways to measure the value of patents. 
For instance, using the number of citations received by a patent instead of using patent counts, or 
computing an index where patents are weighted by their corresponding citations. Along this line, 
we use the total number of citations received by the patents granted each year as the dependent 
variable and show that the reported results are robust to other value-adjusted measures of 
innovation output. 
Independent Variables and Controls 
In order to compute a measure of the strength of REGULATORY FORCES faced by the company 
we use information from the “Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Accomplishment 
Report”, which is issued annually by the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). These reports detail “significant criminal, 
civil, and administrative enforcement actions and the results achieved on behalf of the 
American public and the environment” (U.S. EPA, 1996:1-1). We reviewed these enforcement 
actions to identify those cases where the companies of our sample were defendants in 
environmental lawsuits, and used the number of cases per year as a measure of the strength of 
regulatory forces faced by the company in that year. Similar measures have been validated in 
previous environmental studies (e.g. Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002). We measure NORMATIVE 
FORCES using information from EPA’s TRI program. Use of TRI data is well established in 
management research on environmental impact of corporations (e.g. Anton et al., 2004; e.g. 
King and Lenox, 2002; Klassen and Whybark, 1999; Russo and Harrison, 2005). Under the 
EPA’s Emergency-Right-to-Know Provision, industrial facilities with 10 or more full-time 
employees that release any listed toxic substance in excess of minimum reporting threshold to 
four different media (namely air, water, land, and underground injection) are required to report 
the type and amount of emissions to the EPA (EPA, 2002). Early studies simply used the sum of 
annual emissions of all TRI substances released in a given year as a proxy for the company’s 
potential harm to human health or the environment (Dooley and Fryxell, 1999; Khanna and 
Damon, 1999). However, TRI data reflect releases of noxious emissions but not the level of 
exposure the public or the ecosystem sustains (EPA, 2002). While recent studies (e.g. King and 
Lenox, 2002; Russo and Harrison, 2005) tried to mitigate this shortcoming by weighting 
emissions by the toxicity level of chemical agents, these weighting system are not without 
limitations (see Toffel and Marshall, 2004, for a full discussion on the issue). The main problem 
is that these systems do not account for the medium in which the chemical agent is released 
(e.g. air, water, land) and it is hard to determine the bases on which the toxicity level for a 
particular chemical was established (Toffel and Marshall, 2004). To address these drawbacks, we 
weigh chemicals using the Human Toxicity Potential factor (HTP) developed by Hertwich et al. 
(2001). These authors used the CalTOX model, which is a sophisticated and comprehensive 
multimedia fate and transport model. The result is an index that reflects the potential harm to 
human health of a unit of chemical released into the environment in terms of benzene 
equivalence (carcinogens). A key feature of this toxicity weighing method is that it provides 
each chemical with individual HTP values for different release media. This allows a more 
precise assessment of the harm that chemical releases have on human health (Hertwich,  
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Mateles, Pease, and McKone, 2001). We weight each chemical release by its corresponding HTP 
value in a given year considering the medium into which it was released. We then aggregate 
the results, first across chemicals at facility level, and then finally by parent company. This 
measure was recently validated by Berrone and Gómez-Mejía (2006). 
We assume that the level of emissions is strongly correlated with the strength of normative 
pressures received by the company and thus use them as a proxy taking logarithms to approach 
normality. From our theoretical framework, institutional forces are expected to increase the 
incentives to develop environmental innovations. Yet, these pressures are unlikely to have an 
immediate effect at generating an environmental innovation and thus it is reasonable to 
account for certain lag. Thus, we incorporate both measures of institutional forces with a two-
year lag. 
As a central innovation input we use the variable R&D INTENSITY which is measured during 
the year in which the patents are granted. Previous empirical papers (for instance Hall Griliches 
and Hausman, 1986) focused on estimating the lag structure of the patent production function 
from past R&D expenditures and concluded that the lag structure is very poorly identified given 
the high within-company correlation of R&D spending over time. When lags are included in the 
regression, the sum of the estimated coefficient on the R&D variables is close to the coefficient 
of the contemporaneous level of R&D expenditures when no lag is included. For this reason, we 
use the contemporaneous level of R&D as a measure of innovation input in the patent 
production equation. We normalize the level of R&D expenditures by the number of employees 
to avoid confounding its effect with a size effect, and finally take the logarithm. R&D effort 
measures the company’s R&D intensiveness and is expected to have a positive sign in the patent 
production function. Additionally, as explained in the previous section, we expect companies 
that are more specialized in R&D activities to be more likely to undertake environmental R&D if 
subject to institutional pressures. 
The variable CAPITAL INTENSITY is measured by logarithm of the ratio of the book value of 
the company’s plant and equipment and the number of employees. We incorporate this variable 
in the baseline regression as a way to allow for the potential strategic motivation to ask for 
patents in general to avoid hold-up (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Following the rationale that was 
developed in the previous section, capital-intensive companies are expected to be more likely to 
develop environmental innovations once subject to institutional pressures.  
We use two different measures of organizational slack based on previous literature (Bromiley, 
1991; Fleming and Bromiley, 2003). ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK1 is the ratio of working capital 
to sales and ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK2 is the ratio of the net income and revenues (profit 
margin). We expect the interaction between organizational slack and institutional pressures to 
have a positive effect on the level of environmental innovations. 
We allow for potential economies of scale in patenting including the variable SIZE which is 
measured as the logarithm of employment. All the estimated models include sector,
4 location
5 
and year fixed effects to allow for unobserved heterogeneity between sectors and locations, and 
for annual trends that could affect the level of patenting. 
                                              
4 Sectors are identified at the 2-digit level SIC codes.  
5 Location of the parent company (state dummy if it is a US company or country dummy if it is foreign company).  
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Finally, for some few companies R&D expenditure is missing or not reported. We imputed a 
value of zero R&D expenditures to those companies and included an indicator variable NO R&D 
to control for potential bias in the estimation of the coefficient of R&D effort. 
Empirical Model and Estimation Method 
Given the count nature of the dependent variable, we need to use non-linear estimators as 
Poisson and Negative Binomial regression models. The use of these models is common in 
empirical studies on patenting activity. Poisson models assume that the mean and the variance 
of the dependent variable are equal. Preliminary exploratory analysis of the data using the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test rejected the pure Poisson model in favor of a model where the 
variance is proportional to the mean. Thus, for the purpose of this paper we only present results 
of the negative binomial estimations. The baseline specification for the level of environmental 
innovation is the following: 
ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATIONit  =           ( 1 )  
= f (R&D INTENSITYit +CAPITAL INTENSITYit + SIZEit + NO R&Dit + ρs + φl + τt + eit 
where i denotes companies, t years, ρs sector dummies, φl location dummies, τt year dummies, 
and eit is the error term. The baseline specification includes R&D INTENSITY. 
To test hypotheses 1a and 1b, we incorporate our two lagged measures of institutional forces 
(REGULATORY FORCES and NORMATIVE FORCES) in the baseline equation. To test the 
moderator role of the availability of resources (hypothesis 2a), we incorporate 
ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK1 and 2 each at a time and their interactions with both types of 
institutional pressures. Finally to test the moderator role of the specificity of resources 
(hypothesis 2b), we interact both measures of institutional pressures with R&D INTENSITY and 
CAPITAL INTENSITY respectively which indicate to what extent the company is specialized in 
R&D activities and the importance of fixed investments respectively.  
Results 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. On average there is one environmental patent for 
every four companies in the sample, and those companies with environmental patents receive 
on average 1.74 citations. Concerning institutional pressures, although all companies belong to 
top polluting sectors, we have companies that do not generate toxic emissions in the sample. 
With regard to regulatory pressures, on average only 4% of the companies report litigations 
around environmental issues. Average number of employees and R&D expenditures denote that 
we are working with a sample of big companies with experience in R&D activities. 
Results of the estimated patent production functions are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The 
estimations of the basic specification are shown in Model 1. As expected, bigger companies, 
companies with higher intensity of R&D investments and companies with higher levels of 
capital intensity generate more environmental innovations. 
We first examine the impact of institutional forces on environmental innovation (Hypotheses 
1a and 1b) by including our two year lagged measures of institutional forces in Model 2. The 
inclusion of these two variables increases the explanatory power of the model. Both  
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REGULATORY FORCES and NORMATIVE FORCES have a positive and highly significant effect 
on the level of environmental innovations generated by the company, providing support for 
both hypotheses. Although both types of institutional forces have a positive effect on the level 
of environmental innovations, the coefficient of REGULATORY FORCES is significantly higher 
than that of NORMATIVE FORCES meaning that the former have a much larger effect on 
environmental innovations than the latter. 
In Models 3 and 4 we explore the moderating effect of the availability of resources on the 
generation of environmental innovations (Hypothesis 2a). Both measures ORGANIZATIONAL 
SLACK1 and ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK2 are lagged two periods as our measures of 
institutional pressures. Against our expectations, both measures provide similar results; the 
higher the level of organizational slack the less reactive the company will be to institutional 
forces. Again the effect is weaker or not significant when we consider normative pressures. 
Finally, in Table 3 we explore the extent to which resource specificity has a moderating effect 
on the level of environmental innovations. In Model 5 we include the interaction between both 
types of institutional pressures and R&D INTENSITY and find a positive and significant 
coefficient for regulatory forces while the coefficient is not significant for normative forces. 
Regulatory forces are associated with more environmental innovations in companies that are 
more R&D intensive. In Model 6 we introduce the interaction between both institutional 
pressures and CAPITAL INTENSITY and find again that regulatory forces induce more 
environmental innovations in companies with higher level of capital intensity, while the 
interaction with normative forces is not significant. 
In summary, the empirical analysis developed here suggests that institutional pressures have an 
effect on the level of environmental innovations generated by the company. This effect is 
moderated by the quantity and type of resources owned by the company and thus one should 
not expect different companies to react to the same extent to institutional pressures. We find 
that a company will be more sensitive to institutional pressures the lower its level of 
organizational slack, the higher its level of R&D intensity and capital intensity. We also find 
that regulatory forces are more effective than normative forces in stimulating the company to 
undertake environmental R&D. 
Having established our basic finding, that the availability and type of resources moderate the 
effect of institutional pressures on environmental innovations, we implemented the following 
robustness checks. First, we checked that the obtained results do not depend on the selected 
measure of environmental innovation by exploring with other value-weighted measures 
previously used in empirical literature on patents. Results are qualitatively unchanged when we 
weight each patent by the proportion of the citations received by the company with respect to 
the number of citations received by companies from the same sector. Results also hold if we use 
the sum of citations plus patents as an alternative environmental innovation measure. This 
measure allows us to distinguish between companies with no patents and companies with 
patents but no citations, while the traditional value-weighted measures do not. Finally, results 
also hold when we include company fixed effects in the model; however, we lose several 
observations due to the number of companies with zero patents during the period and to 
companies that only have data for a single year. For this reason we do not report these results 
as the central specification of the paper, and focus on the pooled cross section model. In any 
case, we interpret the results of the model with company fixed effects as an indication that it is 
not likely that the reported significant effects are due to unobserved company level 
heterogeneity.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, we proposed that regulatory and normative forces in favor of environmental 
issues spawn innovative responses in companies. Such innovations are expected to satisfy the 
demands of stakeholders, which in turn, will grant legitimacy expected to be beneficial to the 
organization. We tested our theory using a sample of 340 publicly-traded companies from U.S. 
polluting industries and found support for our main hypotheses. Regulatory and normative 
forces have their predicted positive association with environmental innovation. The interaction 
between institutional pressures and the type of resources (capital and R&D intensity) are 
positively associated with environmental technology productivity when regulatory forces are 
present. Interestingly, however, the interaction of institutional forces and organizational slack 
is negatively related to environmental innovation. Taken together, these results provide 
substantial support for our contention that external forces spawn environmental-related 
technologies according to the resources profile of the company, suggesting that our combined 
approach that considers institutional and RBV predictions is meaningful. The results of this 
study are important for both researchers and managers, as conclusions derived are not only 
theoretically significant but they have a practical content. 
Contributions and Implications for Research 
Our work has theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions and implications to 
different management streams of research. Theoretically, we contribute to institutional theory 
and the resource-based view of the company. The predominant view of institutional theory is 
that external pressure leads to corporate isomorphism (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). On the other hand, the RBV approach suggests that heterogeneity among companies is a 
consequence of the quest for unique resources. In this study, we have argued that both 
theoretical approaches can be integrated to offer a more holistic picture of the corporate 
phenomena, enhancing our understanding of how companies build competitive advantage. This 
combined framework could affect the way researchers examine competitive advantage creation 
as it suggests that institutional pressures may come into play when resources and capabilities 
are developed. That is, institutional pressures can be a source of competitive advantage as they 
establish the boundaries within which organizations can be creative and innovative. 
Empirically, we showed that both regulative and normative forces spawn environmental 
innovation. The fact that the coefficient of regulatory forces is higher than that of normative 
forces could suggest that the potential legitimacy and economic costs of not reacting to 
institutional pressures are higher for regulatory forces than for normative forces. An alternative 
explanation could be that companies subject to normative forces rely more on other 
mechanisms to gain legitimacy rather than on investing in environmental innovations to 
comply with normative pressures. 
We also found that the impact of institutional pressure on innovation is contingent on 
resources. We found that companies with larger sunk investments in production facilities are 
more likely to respond to institutional pressures in novel and matchless manners by 
undertaking environmental R&D. For these companies, the potential losses in case of being 
forced to shut down a given production plant as a result of a preliminary injunction may be 
extremely high given the specificity of the assets involved. Thus, because these companies have 
more at risk than other companies with lower levels of fixed investments, they may use 
environmental patenting as a strategic shield to safeguard their assets from potential losses.  
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Additionally, we found that the level of R&D intensity of the company also moderates the 
relationship between institutional forces and innovation. Companies more specialized in R&D 
activities are more likely to comply with institutional pressures by undertaking environmental 
R&D since they have more expertise and are therefore in a better position to obtain returns 
from R&D expenditures in environmental issues. R&D skills are difficult to acquire, and thus, 
companies without R&D experience may find it more attractive to rely on external providers of 
environmental technologies or/and implement other kind of actions to conform to institutional 
pressures. 
Contrary to our expectation, however, we found that institutional forces have lower impact on 
innovation in those companies with more organizational slack. These results are interesting, but 
challenging to interpret. One possible explanation is that companies may use slack as a buffer 
between themselves and institutional demands and thus sense little pressure to respond to such 
demands. It could be the case that companies with available resources may prefer to pay legal, 
economic, and social sanctions instead of changing products or processes by engaging in risky 
environmental projects. In any case, our finding suggests both the type and the amount of 
resources play a key role in converting external pressures into innovative outcomes. 
This article also fuels the ongoing debate regarding the effectiveness of government in 
promoting environmentally-desirable outcomes. Our findings suggest evidence that the efforts 
of U.S. governmental agencies has a positive influence on environmental innovation. Further 
analysis of environmental regulations and their enforcement mechanisms could shed some light 
on the characteristics that other regulatory bodies could benchmark in order to work efficiently. 
However, our results should be viewed with caution as our measure of regulatory forces does 
not distinguish the type or duration of these enforcement actions. Future research should 
attempt to track these issues. 
Methodologically, we contribute to the environmental research by using patent data at the 
company level to assess environmental innovation. Very little research approached 
environmental innovation as indicated by patent activity and the few exceptions were 
conducted at country or industry levels. Additionally, and in line with previous studies on 
patents, we find that it is important to use value-adjusted patent measures to identify the main 
effects. 
Implications for Managers 
External pressures towards more corporate responsibility require environmental strategies to 
conform to institutional demands, ensure societal legitimacy, and secure organizational success. 
Given that a company’s competitive advantage depends on its ability to innovate in ways that 
allow it to change to new scenarios that its rivals cannot easily imitate, environmental 
innovation appears to be a valuable policy for managers to follow. 
Our work suggests that paying attention to external influences may be a source of inspiration 
for managers to develop unique resources. However, this does not imply that managers need to 
wait for unavoidable pressures before developing environmental innovation. Decision makers 
can be proactive by scanning the environment and take the lead on this type of activity since it 
is expected to have a salutary effect on company performance. 
An important issue is that the presence of resources does not guarantee that institutional 
pressure will be transformed into productive innovation. On the contrary, our results suggest 
that managers with slack may adopt a risk-averse strategy by avoiding environmental  
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initiatives. This posture could have deleterious effects on company performance and thus 
should be taken into account by monitoring agents such as the board of directors. 
Finally, managers should be aware of the differences that exist between companies that are 
specialized in R&D activities and companies without such experience. Our findings suggest that 
the former can more easily respond to institutional pressures by developing environmental 
innovations than the latter. Thus, managers should turn their attention to the efficient use of 
their resources. 
Caveats and Future Research 
Our study is not without limitations. At least three caveats deserve to be mentioned, which 
could be rectified in future research. First, we concentrated our analysis on publicly-traded 
companies in the U.S. context. Thus, our findings may not be open to generalization about 
privately-held companies, which may consider different factors in strategic choices and in 
strategies themselves (Trostel and Nichols, 1982), nor to other geographical regions. Future 
research can extend the analysis to organizational structures like privately-owned companies or 
family companies. Also, our work could be extended by studying environmental innovation in 
non-U.S. contexts to account for differences in regional environments. 
A second caveat refers to the boundaries of our analysis. Even though we have limited 
ourselves to regulatory and normative forces, clearly, other factors are also involved in 
facilitating environmental innovation. Particularly interesting is the study of the “cognitive 
pillar”, which we have omitted in our work. Cultural elements such as individual values are 
likely to govern environmental choices and strategic decisions (Bansal and Roth, 2000). This 
issue presents both opportunities and challenges to future research given that assessment of 
these data is often difficult and severely limited. 
Another caution worth noting is that in this paper we do not analyze the impact of 
environmental innovation on either financial or environmental performance. It would be very 
interesting to explore whether those companies that develop environmental innovations reduce 
their levels of emissions and/or obtain a financial benefit with respect to companies that do 
not. 
Finally, another exiting avenue for future research is the extent to which companies develop 
environmental innovation to later commercialize them in the market (through licensing, for 
instance) instead of internal use. The decision to whether “make or buy” may play a key role in 
environmental issues and research could be enhanced by developing this line of inquiry. 
Final Comment 
Increased social awareness of organizational wrongdoing and stakeholder pressures have placed 
environment concerns as an important part of the strategic choices of companies. Therefore, 
understanding the determinants of environmental innovation and its relationship with company 
performance is of critical importance to the effective management of corporations. We hope our 
work contributes to this goal. However, it is important to remember that environmental 
innovation is not only relevant in economic terms, but also from a social point of view as it is 
intended to alleviate a noxious burden shouldered by society as a whole.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  Mean St. Dev. Min.  Max.
Patents 0.24  0.98  0  13 
Citations 1.74  3.63  0  27 
Regulatory forces  0.04  0.24  0  3 
Normative forces  67E+6  18E+8  0  6.53E+10 
Size 33  63  0.005  594 
R&D Expenditures  446  1,026  0  7,900 
Capital Intensity  644  5,261  0,01  123,234 
Working Capital/Sales  1.79  16,06  -1.78  381.9 
Revenues/Income -107  1,449  -39,372  726 
No R&D  0.093  0.231  0  1 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics about citations correspond to the subsample of companies with 
environmental patents. R&D expenditures and capital intensity are in thousands of Euros. Size 
is in thousands of employees. Normative forces are in thousands of pounds. 
Table 2 
Negative Binomial Estimations 
Dependent variable: Environmental innovations 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Size (t)  0.661*** 0.413*** 0.392**  0.369** 
R&D effort (t)  1.722*** 1.131*** 0.588  0.614 
Capital Intensity (t) 0.620***  0.503***  0.436***  0.545*** 
Regulatory forces(t-2) ---  1.936***  2.608***  1.212** 
Normative forces(t-2)  --- 0.089***  0.007  0.050 
Org. slack1(t-2)  --- ---  0.124  --- 
Org. slak1(t-2)*Regulatory forces(t-2)  ---  ---     -0.647***  --- 
Org. slack1(t-2)*Normative forces(t-2)  --- ---  0.097  --- 
Org. slack2(t-2)  --- ---  ---  0.001 
Org. slack2(t-2)*Regulatory forces(t-2)  ---  ---  ---     -0.013** 
Org. slack2 (t-2)*Normative forces(t-2)  ---  ---  ---     -0.009* 
No R&D (t)  0.511 1.386  1.620  1.123 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Geographical dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant -8.503***  -6.021*** -5.814*** -6.944*** 
Sample size  916  886  810  847 
Wald Chi2  7,354.67  9,601.4  12,712.6  12,012.27 
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Table 3 
Negative Binomial Estimations 
Dependent variable: Environmental innovations 
  (5) (6) 
Size (t)  0.383** 0.442*** 
R&D intensity (t)  0.240 0.024 
Capital intensity(t)  0.636*** 0.594** 
Regulatory forces(t-2)  0.669 -6.576 
Normative forces(t-2)  0.047 0.078 
R&D intensity(t)*Regulatory forces(t-2)  2.104** 2.844** 
R&D intensity(t)*Normative forces(t-2)  -0.256 -0.023 
Capital intensity(t)*Regulatory forces(t-2)  --- 1.559** 
Capital intensity(t)*Normative forces(t-2)  --- -0.019 
No R&D (t)  1.094 1.303 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes 
Geographical dummies  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
Constant -7.264***  -7.394*** 
Sample size  886  816 
Wald Chi2  12,616.21  14,644.83 
 